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1. Introduction 
 
“There is nothing invariable in the economy except its constant change. Technological 
change and the corresponding restructuring of industry are obvious examples” (Witt, 
2003a: ix). A central focus of evolutionary dynamics is on processes which are capable 
of expanding their state space through the generation of previously non-existent states. 
In this sense, evolution is seen as “the self- transformation over time of a system under 
consideration” (ibid: 12-13). “Self-transformation can be split into two logically (and 
also usually ontologically) distinct processes: the emergence and the dissemination of 
novelty.” 
 The distinction between emergence and dissemination of novelty as well as the 
role of learning in the explanation of self- transformation processes implies, according to 
Witt, two main explanatory problems. On the one hand, there is a need to provide 
explanations for the phenomena and conditions without knowing the meaning of the 
(next) emerging novelty. This kind of problem gives rise to what Witt calls pre-
revelation analysis. On the other hand, another kind of problem arises once novelty has 
revealed its meaning: this is the post-revelation analysis. As a result, any theory of 
evolution has two tasks: “(1) to explain how, under what conditions, novelty is being 
generated within the explanatory domain of theory; and (2) to explain what happens as a 
consequence of novelty having emerged within the domain. The bulk of explanatory 
efforts usually focuses on the second task” (ibid: 13). This seems to be the case with 
innovation studies. In fact, over the last two decades these studies have seen important 
advances. For example, in the framework of evolutionary analysis of economic change, 
and more particularly of innovation systems, the emergence of technical and 
institutional novelties and learning processes that take place at the individual and 
organisational level have been considered the most important processes that characterise 
innovation (Lundvall, 1998, 2004; Edquist, 2000). This paper assumes the importance 
of these works. However, as Loasby has pointed out, only the assumption that some 
things do not change permits the understanding of change (Loasby, 1999: 14). Thus, any 
explanation of economic change requires the existence of some kind of regularity within 
change. Only then can we identify certain general and permanent principles that may 
explain evolution in the economic domain. 
 2 
 A first step towards the finding of these principles, is the fulfilment of a 
“heuristic task”. The latter consists of formulating concepts and instruments that permit 
one to describe and analyse economic change. This paper is an attempt to approach this 
heuristic task, which is necessarily prior to the economic analysis of change. The 
challenge is to provide the analytical possibility of studying the consequences of 
novelties in agents’ action objectives. Thus, the paper will start with developing a 
conceptual framework to analyse economic change. The theoretical approach presented 
in this paper is based on the concept of an (economic) action plan, defined as the 
projective linkage between actions (means) and objectives (ends). The concept of an 
action plan will prove useful in the understanding of economic change, as it reveals the 
different sources of novelty to be aware of. The proposed concepts of cognitive 
dynamics and ethical dynamics as well as their consequences in terms of novelties are 
integrated into the notion of the action plan as a heuristic model to represent economic 
dynamics. These two dynamics configure what agents understand things are, what they 
may be and should be in their “space of representations” (Loasby, 1999), which is to say 
that cognitive and ethical dynamics constitute the basic elements of projective action. 
From the so called “action plan approach”, it will be argued how both cognitive and 
ethical dynamics are linked to the emergence of novelties. In particular, ethical 
dynamics give rise to ethical novelty, understood as the genuine creation in the space of 
representations of new objectives of action or their hierarchical reorganisation. 
 The conceptual framework proposed enables us to establish our main 
hypothesis: ethical novelty is another source of economic change. This kind of novelty 
will serve as an example of how agents’ action plans endogenously generate structural 
change. Agents’ rationality also depends on the objectives and motivations that they 
have. Thus, what gives an impulse to economic activity is then not only economic 
calculus (Hayek’s (1937) “Pure Logic of Choice”) but the real possibility of developing 
an “open rationality”, the rationality of the unexpected (Shackle, 1972; Loasby, 1996). 
 The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 considers the role of knowledge and 
learning processes in the explanation of economic change. Section 3 presents the 
“action plan approach”. Section 4 shows the relationship between the action plan 
approach and novelty; how ethical novelty can be treated, and in what sense ethical 
novelty is a source of economic change. Section 5 presents some concluding remarks. 
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2. Knowledge acquisition and learning processes 
 
Learning and knowledge acquisition processes are central to the explanation of 
economic change. Recent attempts to provide an analytical foundation of evolutionary 
economics describe economic evolution as “a growth of knowledge process” (Dopfer & 
Potts, 2004: 21). As Metcalfe and Foster (2004: xi) recognise, knowledge acquired by 
individual agents and the interaction of agents’ knowledge constitute the basis for 
evolution and complexity of economic processes. This section presents a brief 
discussion of the role of knowledge in economics. 
 
2.1 Learning in evolutionary environments 
In the tradition of evolutionary economics, learning processes play a major role in the 
explanation of economic change. Given the evolutionary assumption that agents’ 
learning processes are ongoing, it is interesting to address the questions of why and what 
agents learn. A succinct answer to these two questions from an evolutionary perspective 
is that agents have ‘bounded rationality’ (why) and because of this they have to deploy 
factual and normative learning processes (Witt, 2003b) that allow them also to 
implement factual and normative knowledge (what). In evolutionary models, agents 
have bounded rationality, limited processing capacities, and an imperfect understanding 
of the environment and the future conditions governing the economic system. 
 Agents are supposed to be boundedly rational (Simon, 1983, 1970), behaving 
according to the so-called behavioural model instead of the Olympian one of subjective 
expected utility theory. Simon proposes that “rationality could focus on dealing with 
one or a few problems at a time, with the expectation that when other problems arise 
there would be time to deal with those too” (Simon, 1983: 20). What the mechanisms 
are for this kind of rationality is equivalent to asking which characteristics an organism 
needs to be capable of dealing with bounded rationality. Simon proposes that it needs: 
first, some way of focusing on the things that need attention at a given time (Simon, 
1983: 19); second, a mechanism able to generate alternatives: the problem consists 
mainly of searching for good alternatives; and third, a certain capacity to acquire facts 
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about the environment in which we find ourselves and a modest capability for drawing 
inferences from them. 
 All these considerations mean that agents come up with standard operating 
procedures and routines that rule their daily activities.2 These routines are fairly stable, 
practical and accurate in interpreting and responding to a very complex environment. 
Thus, in evolutionary environments, agents learn because they do not know everything: 
“[b]ecause they lack perfect knowledge these agents are likely to try to improve their 
knowledge” (Witt, 2003b: 79) Moreover, “[agents’] learning takes time, bounded 
rationality transcends the boundaries of a static representation of choice problems” 
(ibid.). Thus, for improving knowledge, agents deploy learning processes; in this sense, 
Dosi et al. (1996) claim that learning may occur either due to: (1) a lack of information 
about the world; (2) an imprecise knowledge of its structure; (3) when the agents have a 
limited set of actions in order to cope with problems they face; (4) when agents have a 
changing and blurred understanding of what their goals and preferences are.3 
 Dosi et al. (1996) propose that learning has three interrelated meanings (associated 
with the classification of different kinds of knowledge classified according to tacitness, as 
in Winter (1987)). These are: (1) acquisition of more information, (2) various forms of 
increasing knowledge stricto sensu, and (3) the articulation and codification of previously 
tacit knowledge. These precisions permit the authors to establish that a property of learning 
processes is the diversity of learning modes and sources of knowledge. (In the context of 
different technologies and sectors, these can be, for example, learning-by-doing and 
learning-by-interacting). Dosi et al. (1996) identify four classes of objects of learning: (a) 
the ‘states-of-the-world’, (b) other agents’ behaviour, (c) problem-solving, and (d) one’s 
own preferences. From an appreciative perspective, Witt (2003b) states, in relation to 
policy making, that “[i]n an evolutionary perspective, (…) the positive and normative 
knowledge that informs the actions of the agents involved can change through experience 
and induced inventive learning.” That is, agents incorporate factual and normative 
                                                 
2 Simon (1986: 21). The analytic value of bounded rationality is that it is linked to the concept of routine. 
This concept is reformulated later in an evolutionary perspective by Nelson & Winter (1982: 14-19) as is 
suggested by the lecture of the Darwinian metaphor proposed by Witt (2003a: 10-11). 
3 It should be noted that reasons (1) and (2) are related to the imperfect understanding of the environment 
(world). However, reason (3) highlights what could be called insufficient understanding of the world. 
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knowledge derived from learning processes. These elements constitute the foundation on 
which the actions that the agent deploys are based. The acquisition of these types of 
knowledge makes it somewhat easier to cope with bounded rationality. 
 Different degrees of imperfect understanding and imperfect path-dependent 
learning imply persistent heterogeneity among agents, even when they have identical 
opportunities and information. Learning acquires great importance in evolutionary 
environments where heterogeneous agents display various forms of bounded rationality. 
However, according to Loasby, this view of bounded rationality does not overcome the 
problem of knowledge in economics; learning processes are not sufficient to understand 
how agents deal with complex environments (Loasby, 1999: 3). 
 
2.2 “The problem of knowledge” 
In his discussion on “The Problem of Knowledge”, Loasby (1999, Chp. 1) explores the 
economic consequences of uncertainty. He departs from the idea (the fact) that agents 
have limited knowledge about the world, about the reality within which they deploy 
their action. He identifies six obstacles to complete knowledge: (1) the insufficiency of 
induction; (2) complexity; (3) the limits of human cognit ion; (4) exogenous change; (5) 
the interdependence of individual initiatives; and (6) conflicting ideas and purposes 
(ibid.: 1-2). It is possible to cluster these obstacles into 2 main groups, the first referring 
to limits of human capacities ((1) and (3)) and the second linked to the complexity of 
the universe ((2), (4), (5) and (6)). As a result of human limitations and the inherent 
complexity of the universe, agents are located in a context of incomplete knowledge, 
and therefore of substantive uncertainty. It is necessarily in this context that agents live, 
make choices, produce, innovate, etc. Novelty plays an essential role in the continuous 
transformation of this (complex) environment, which makes complete knowledge 
impossible. This is a key idea for Loasby who sees the economic system as “a prime 
source of novelty” (ibid.: 2). Although knowledge is seriously incomplete, it might be 
improved. However, the concept of learning, understood as the “acquisition of 
information from a pre-specified set, or (as the) convergence on the correct model” 
(ibid.: 3) is not enough, in Loasby’s view, to address the issue of knowledge 
improvement and creation. 
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 Creating new knowledge is substantially different from discovering knowledge 
that already exists and is waiting to be discovered (pre-specified set; correct model).4 
Moreover, knowledge may be wrong. Fallibility is, according to Loasby, a key 
characteristic of knowledge. “Knowledge should be considered as conjectural, in Karl 
Popper’s sense (1963) of hypotheses (...) which always remain open to refutation” 
(Loasby, 1999: 2). As a consequence there is not such a thing as a predetermined correct 
model on which agents can converge through learning processes. They do, however, 
need to cope with incomplete and fallible knowledge, taking appropriate precautions 
against omissions and error. In other words, in order to cope with the complexity of the 
universe and their limited capacities, agents need to organise their (limited and fallible) 
knowledge. 
 How agents manage to organise their knowledge is a major question for 
economists according to Loasby. 5 A second major question would be how knowledge is 
improved and co-ordinated. Answers to the second question will give the key to 
understanding novelty generation and economic change. Nevertheless, this sort of issue 
should not be addressed before we structure the ideas relating to the first question: the 
organisation of knowledge. The way in which knowledge is improved and co-ordinated 
depends on how it is organised. As a result, before addressing the questions of how 
knowledge is created and diffused through the economic system and how these 
processes transform the system, economists must organise their knowledge about the 
ways in which people organise their knowledge (ibid.: 8). 
 Following Loasby’s argument, as knowledge is incomplete and fallible, lacking a 
complete system of classification, agents need some means of achieving closure in order to 
make decisions – a means of organising their knowledge. Each individual has his/her own 
perception of reality, his/her own representation of the world. Each develops an 
interpretative framework that permits him/her to achieve closure and therefore make 
decisions. “These personal frameworks are substantially influenced by the assumptions, 
conventions, categories, rules, routines and programmes by which (agents) are surrounded 
from birth and which develop through a cumulative mixture of deliberation and unintended 
consequences” (ibid.: 12). Institutions are thus defined as the frameworks and procedures 
                                                 
4 This seems to be the case, for example, with Kirzner’s (1992, Ch 2) interpretation of the market process. 
5 An idea that Loasby himself traces back to Adam Smith (1980 [1795]). See also Hayek (1937, 1945). 
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in common use within any group. All individual and collective subjective representations 
of the world form what Loasby calls the space of representations: “All action is decided in 
the space of representations” (ibid.: 10). 
 Summing up Loasby’s argument on the organisation of knowledge, we could state 
that agents cope with their inherently incomplete and fallible knowledge about the world 
by building fairly stable interpretative frameworks (closure)6 and action procedures which 
permit them to make decisions in a context of substantial uncertainty. Some of these 
frameworks and procedures are common to groups of agents; in this case they may be 
referred to as institutions. All frameworks and representations of the world form the space 
of representations within which all action is decided. The better we, as economists, 
organise our knowledge about how economic agents organise their knowledge, the better 
we will be able to answer the questions of how knowledge is improved and diffused and 
the better we will therefore explain processes of economic change.  
 Loasby’s point is clear and the concepts of “closure”, “personal frameworks”, 
“space of representations” and “institutions” provide key elements for constructing a 
theory of the organisation of knowledge within “pre-revelation” analysis. This can then 
explain how novelty is being generated within the explanatory domain of theory. However, 
in order to fulfil the latter task, some heuristic work remains to be done. The next section is 
devoted to this task. 
 
 
3. Action plans and knowledge 
 
3.1 Agents’ representation frameworks 
Taking Loasby’s arguments on the characteristics and organisation of knowledge as a 
starting point, we may construct an analytical framework which provides tools for a 
systematic explanation of how the space of representations and the agents’ frameworks 
for achieving closure are organised. We may argue that the personal frameworks of 
representations can be articulated in the context of the following analytical structure: 
                                                 
6 A very similar idea to “imposing closure” implied in innovation literature is “constructing 
predictability”. The complexity of technologies and the process involved make unpredictability (Pavitt, 
1998) a property of technological systems. See also Nigthingale (2004: 3). 
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each person, at any given instant of time, can be characterised by several attributes, such 
as his set of beliefs, values, attitudes, and theoretical as well as technical representations 
about the world. This set includes rational as well as non-rational elements, conscious 
and non-conscious ones. All these elements which contribute to shaping his personal 
space of representations are, of course, subject to change (evolution). 
 Let us consider the following analytical distinction between: (a) the agents’ 
perception of reality; what it is or might be in the future; and (b) the agents’ conception 
of what reality should be . Agents’ representations combine their perception of what 
reality is (or what is possible in any imagined sense) with their conception of what 
reality should be. Changes in these perceptions and conceptions give rise to changes in 
what Loasby terms the space of representations. To describe these transformations we 
propose the following concepts of cognitive and ethical dynamics. 
 Cognitive dynamics refers to individuals’ and organisations’ (agents’) 
perception and understanding of reality. This perception is based on accumulated 
knowledge through past experience, on the present environment where action takes 
place, and on expectations of future phenomena or events (Rubio de Urquía, 1998, 
2003, 2004). Cognitive dynamics should therefore be understood as the evolution of 
agents’ perception of what reality is or might be in the future. Cumulative knowledge, 
particularly tacit knowledge, and learning processes play a major role in this 
development. However, cognitive dynamics do not exhaust the content of Loasby’s 
“personal frameworks”. The role of values, beliefs, attitudes, etc., is recognised in the 
literature explaining economic change (Dosi & Nelson, 1994; Dosi et al., 1996), but has 
not been systematically analysed. Thus, the space of representations is not only 
dependent on knowledge – which plays, without doubt, a fundamental role – but also on 
what agents consider (desire, imagine, etc.) things should be.7 The concept of ethical 
dynamics covers these considerations. 
 Ethical dynamics refers to the evolution in agents’ conception of what reality 
should be . The ethical content of the agents’ representation framework is attached to 
their system of beliefs, values and attitudes. Ethical dynamics introduce order within the 
personal representation space, as will be discussed in section 4 (Rubio de Urquía, 2005). 
                                                 
7 The implications for economic change of other types of ‘values’ such as aesthetical values, has also 
been recognised by Loasby (2002: 1230), who quotes Smith ([1795] 1980). 
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 It is important to clarify that the words “ethics” and “ethical” are used here in a 
very technical sense. The concept of “ethical dynamics” is not based on an a priori 
formulation of normative criteria. It has a simple analytical value aiming at articulating 
agents’ personal space of representations. By stating that agents have a personal 
conception of what reality should be which evolves over time, we are not giving any 
particular aprioristic content to that conception. 
 The above two personal dynamics are supported by a social and more general 
one: the dynamics of transformation of the agents’ environment. This magna dinamica 
includes an important element: the social dissemination of information throughout 
society that may be referred to as cultural dynamics. 
 From the concepts of cognitive, ethical and cultural dynamics it is possible to 
represent how agents act. This representation will be based on an analytical ‘template’ 
named the “action plan approach”. This is the base for the heuristic task, that is, the 
proposal of concepts and instruments that permit us to organise our knowledge about 
how agents organise their knowledge. As has been pointed out, economists do recognise 
the roles of ethical and aesthetical values, beliefs, attitudes, etc., in explaining economic 
change – at least in appreciative theorising (see, for example, Dosi & Nelson (1994: 
159); Dosi et al. (1996); Witt (2003b); Smith ([1795] 1980); Loasby (2002); Shackle 
(1972); Rubio de Urquía (2003, 2005), Borrás (2004)). The “action plan” is a tool that 
permits us to represent and integrate all these elements and therefore to see how the 
defined concepts of cognitive, ethical and cultural dynamics inform action. However, in 
the following sections it will be shown that the action plan approach has a specific 
analytic value for understanding economic processes; in particular, processes of 
economic change.8 
 
3.2 “Action plan”: definition, morphology and characteristics 
An action plan is defined as the agent’s projective link of actions with objectives.9 At 
any given instant t, the personal action plan of an agent i ( itp ) is a projective structure 
                                                 
8 The implications of the “action plan” approach are wider than those presented here. See Rubio de 
Urquía (2003, 2005), Encinar & Muñoz (2005, 2006), and Rodríguez (2002) in an Austrian perspective. 
9 The concept of “action plan” is pervasive in economics. It can be found in Keynes (1936), Hicks (1939), 
Stackelberg (1946), Eucken (1943), Debreu (1959), Malinvaud (1999), Boulding (1991), Hayek (1937; 
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that links the agents set of actions (means) { }itA  with his set of objectives { }itO . This 
structure itp  generates a subjective time horizon in the personal space of representations 
(Rubio de Urquía, 2003: 23). Actions in this context should be understood as means that 
could be activities as well as objects. An objective is an end or a goal that the agent 
pursues. 
 The very nature of action plans is the projective character of the orderings 
involved. This refers not only to the fact that time – and timing – plays a central role in 
explaining human (economic) action, but also that actions and objectives need to be 
imagined. Moreover, the set of actions { }itA  and objectives { }itO  can be manifold: 
material or not; located at any point in time, although obviously not all at the same 
point; possible in some physical sense or not; able to be expressed in monetary terms or 
not; etc. Agents do not possess exact and complete knowledge of all the possibilities 
that are available to them at any given instant. Ignorance or uncertainty, as well as the 
possibility of having fallible knowledge, make it impossible for agents to anticipate the 
consequences of their actions, which are deployed in interaction with other agents’ 
plans. 
 However, agents are impelled to act, and for this they use their intelligence as 
well as their knowledge. Given the characteristics of their knowledge, closures and 
other operations are necessary to set up their action plans. The action plan is a rather 
general open structure.10 
 
                                                                                                                                               
1945), etc. In some authors, plans are merely a name (Debreu, Malinvaud); in others (Eucken, Rubio de 
Urquía, etc.) it is a central concept. It is also recognized in neuroscience: Fuster (2003)localizes “plans of 
action” in the pre-frontal cortex of the human brain. (See also Fuster (2004) and Hayek (1952)) 
10 A very close concept to (economic) action plan is the concept of routines  (Nelson & Winter, 1982; 
Becker, 2003). Routines in this context could be seen as parts of plans. A plan admits routines: a routine 
would be a ‘mechanised’ part of an action plan. 
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t 1 t + t 
1 a 
2 a 1 O 
3 a 
 
t1t +t
1a
2a 1O
3a
2t +
2O
 
Figure 1 Figure 2 
 
 The morphology, or structure, of an action plan can be represented by using 
simple graphs. For example, Figures 1 and 2 show the basic structure of an action plan. 
In Figure 1 three actions, { } { }=i 1 2 3A a , a , a , and a single objective 1O  are considered. We 
have also two analytical points in time, t and t + 1, upon which the action is defined and 
is carried out. (This time dimension can be expressed using indexes; however, to 
simplify notation, given the simplicity of these examples, we will not make use of 
indexes.) The relationships between the actions and the objectives are indicated by 
arrows. Actions 1a  and 2a  are carried out in t, and action 3a  is carried out in t + 1. For 
the case at hand, the three actions are perceived at t by the agent that produces the action 
plan as necessary and sufficient for objective 1O  to be achieved at t + 1. A very simple 
example of this plan could be the following: the agent plans to buy a car ( 1O ). In order 
to get it, he buys a car catalogue ( 1a ) and compares the possible options according to 
his/her preferences and his/her earnings ( 2a ); in the next step (t + 1) he/she buys it ( 3a ). 
Figure 2 represents a slightly more complex plan: actions 1a  and 2a  lead to the 
achievement of objective 1O  at time t + 1, and this objective, together with action 3a  – 
which also influences 1O  as is indicated by the broken arrow – determine the 
achievement of objective 2O  at time t + 2. For example, now the agent plans to buy a 
car but has not enough liquidity. So he proposes an intermediate objective: to obtain the 
money; thus 1O  leads to 2O  in the next period. In order to get the money that permits 
him/her to achieve 2O , he/she goes to the bank and asks for a credit – action 1a  – and he 
 12 
compares the alternative cars – action 2a . Now, action 3a  cannot be taken in t + 1; he 
has to wait to get the financial support in t + 1 ( 1O ) in order to finally buy the car in 
t + 2 and therefore achieve 2O , which is to fulfil his plan. 
 Naturally, action plans can be more complex than the simple ones represented 
here. Besides, agents may imagine contemporary action plans. If any such plans demand 
actions or objectives that are mutually exclusive or manifest some incompatibility (I 
cannot be working in London and visiting a friend in Melbourne at the same time) 
agents would have to make a choice. But it could also happen that several plans are 
going on simultaneously (I can drive my car to work and keep myself informed by 
listening to the news on the radio). These basic concepts make it possible to represent 
any type of action plan imaginable, with hierarchical dependencies among ends and 
actions (as in Fig. 3 and 4) and with as many analytical moments of time as needed. An 
important characteristic of plans is that action plans do not have to be successful or even 
feasible: success and feasibility of plans depend on the knowledge the agent uses in 
forging them, on how the knowledge is used, and on the result of interaction with others 
agents’ plans (there can be mistakes, erroneous information, etc.). 
 Thus, actions could lead to attaining pursued objectives or not: for example, the 
orderings  can violate logical or scientific laws: in this sense, we would say they are 
inconsistent from a logical or material point of view. For example, let the objective of a 
person 1O  be “to fly” and 1a  the physical and human means, and 2a  “to jump” from a 
window. 
 
t1t +t
1a
2a 1O
 
Figure 3 
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This represents an inconsistent plan due to technical unfeasibility: the violation of a 
physical law. The inconsistency is of a general physical character. In cases like this, the 
actions involved are not efficient in achieving the pursued ends. Moreover, objectives 
could cancel each other out because of a logical contradiction or because of competition 
for actions (means) needed to accomplish them. 
 
t1t +t
1a
2a 2O
3a
*
1O
na
 
t1t +t
1a
2a 2O
3a
*
1O
na
 
Figure 4 Figure 5 
 
For example, consider Figures 4 and 5. In Figure 4 the action plan described contains an 
objective *1O  which is fundamental in the agent’s scale of valuation. Let it be to take 
good care of his/her family life. This is the main end pursued and thus the rest of the 
objectives and actions should lead to it and be in accordance with it. In this example, 
suppose that the agent proposes a second objective 2O , which operates as a means to an 
end: to have a good job, which implies a set of actions ( 1 na,...a ) in the same or different 
time spans. This gives the agent the possibility to attain a certain level of income and to 
assure a certain standard of living for his family.11 In Figure 4, the actions carried out 
will lead to the objectives proposed. However, take a variation of this example, 
illustrated by Figure 5. Here, some elements appear that make it impossible to fulfil the 
plan in which good family life is the main objective. On the one hand, the agent 
                                                 
11 The symbol * in *
1
O  is intended to represent the hierarchical primacy of this objective over others. 
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maintains the strict preference of *1O  over 2O , but on the other, he/she allocates a 
growing number of hours to work, in such a way that he/she has no time for his/her 
family life. When the agent devotes a maximum number of hours each day to work and 
to complementary activities (dinners, etc.) and, at the same time, maintains the 
hierarchy of '1O  over 2O , then he/she is formulating an internally inconsistent plan. This 
means that the agent pursuing 2O  in the way just described is intrinsically denying the 
possibility of accomplishing '1O , which constitutes a flagrant paradox. All this results in 
what is referred to as “internal inconsistency” of action plans.12 
 A different source of cancellation of pursued objectives which should be 
considered is “external inconsistency”. External inconsistency is linked to the 
interaction among plans.13 Two different sources of external inconsistency arise: (1) the 
agent’s action plan does not take into account relevant information about the social 
environment in which it interacts with the action plans of other agents; or (2) the 
objectives and demands for action effected by the other agents obstruct the feasibility 
(and so the performance) of the plan the agent is trying to deploy. Concepts such as co-
ordination, lock- in effects, etc., are related to interaction of plans. 
 
3.2 On “action plans” and economics 
It is important to insist on the idea that, in the action plan framework, actions (means) 
and objectives are not given in the Robbins (1935) sense. Considering actions and 
objectives as given enables one only to treat static problems; however, economic change 
is by definition a dynamic phenomenon. As a result, action plans are ‘living’ and 
dynamic economic elements, because they admit any type of change in their 
components (actions and objectives). Our approach provides an analytical structure 
representing the production of action plans, and their elements. 
 Following Robbins (1935), economic theory has to be understood as the science 
that studies the process of the constitution of an action under which scarce means (or, 
more generally, actions) are allocated to alternative ends (or, more generally, 
objectives). In this context, the object of economic theory seems to be the analysis of 
                                                 
12 See Rubio de Urquía (2003, 2005), Encinar (2002) and Encinar & Muñoz (2005, 2006). 
13 Hayek (1937) draws attention on “conflicting expectations”, “mutual compatibility of intentions”, etc. 
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the allocation of scarce resources to given ends. Often economic theory is identified 
with a system to describe the impact of a technology that increases the efficiency of 
resource allocation and which may uncover new uses or applications of the resources 
for given objectives.14 How can we make this view of economic theory compatible with 
the approach based on the concept of action plans? 
 The classical vision, captured in the reduced interpretation of Robbins’ 
definition, might be considered a special case within the action plan approach: it is a 
“type” of action in which both the sets of means (actions) and objectives are given and 
are effectively known by agents. With the action plan approach, it is not a pre-requisite 
that sets of actions and objectives need to be given in any particular order. Action plans 
are ‘open’ and dynamic economic entities, so they admit any type of incorporation or 
alteration of their parts. It is in this sense that the approach leads us to focus on the  
production of action by agents versus the standard view based on a mere technology of 
choice. 
 In his recent works Rubio de Urquía has proposed the following definition of 
economic theory: “we understand Economic Theory as the study of: (1) how and why 
economic agents who interact in an environment adopt some action plans and not others 
and (2) what effects the adoption of certain action plans have” (Ibid., 2005). This 
definition is the basis for the approach adopted in this paper. An important remaining 
task is to explain how the interaction of plans induces economic change. Before this 
question is addressed it is necessary to go one step back. 
 The understanding of the agent’s activities might be explained, in the simplest 
possible case, as follows. Let us assume the following sequence of analytical moments 
of the action plan: (a) the constitution of the set of action plans, that is, the construction 
of the set of possibilities of action as perceived by the agent and which refers to what 
the agent will do, why he/she will do it, and how he/she will do it (this is a fundamental 
moment, as will be shown below); (b) the selection of an “action plan” from the set of 
action plans previously constructed; (c) the attempt to carry out  the selected action 
                                                 
14 This theoretical exercise of the “technology of choice” (“Pure Logic of Choice” (Hayek, 1937, 1945)) 
has been developing ever since the systematic analysis and application of the optimisation principle. In 
the neoclassical model, this is consistent with the maximization of an objective function subject to 
restrictions. This has been criticised from different fields, even from game theory (Rubinstein, 1998). 
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plan; (d) the evaluation of the result by the agent in terms of the objective, once the 
plan has been carried out. Note that once the evaluation has taken place, the agent may 
be able to revise the structure of his/her set of action plans enabled by a process that has 
to do with learning.15 
 The analytical moments (a) and (b) clearly differ from (c) and (d). In fact, the 
constitution as well as the selection of action plans has to do with the individuality of 
agents. Moment (c) is related to interaction, and (d) to learning processes. The rest of 
this sub-section deals with these matters. 
 From a logical point of view, plans are constituted – analytical moment (a); that 
is, they are produced by agents before they are selected and begin interaction. So the 
first question that arises is: where do plans come from? It is here where cognitive and 
ethical dynamics16 play their essential roles: it is the agent’s knowledge and evolution of 
the perception of what reality is and what it should be, that results from learning 
processes as well as from the creativity he deploys, that shapes his plans.  Cognitive and 
ethical dynamics constitute the agent’s action space or, in Loasby’s terminology, 
personal space of representation: the space that he considers as possible and within 
which plans have full meaning. This space is essentially a projective one. 
 Once the plans have been produced, the agent selects – analytical moment (b): 
the one(s) he perceives as the best in the projected (imagined) circumstances that he 
thinks will prevail. The selected plans are the ones that agents try to carry out by 
interacting with other agents’ plans — analytical moment (c).17 The development of 
plans is an interactive process. The performance of this interaction, and their results in 
terms of achieving objectives, generate the informa tion that, in a feedback process, is 
evaluated and re- introduced into future plans, thus inducing a learning process. The 
differences between the planned and effective or, in other terms, ex ante and ex post 
results induce this (positive or negative) learning analytical moment (d).18 It is during 
                                                 
15 An interesting exercise is  to compare this analytical sequence with Potts (2000), especially chapter 5. 
16 As well as the collective cultural dynamics. 
17 This analytical moment (the attempt to carry out the selected plan and its consequences) or post-
revelation analysis is what has attracted the attention of research and is most prevalent in the literature. 
However, it is essential to consider not only this analytic moment but all four in order to have the whole 
picture of dynamic processes. 
18 Positive learning increases a coordination among plans; negative learning diminishes it. 
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the evaluation of agents in terms of achieving their objectives where the eventual 
inconsistencies (internal as well as external) of action plans arise. 
 From interactions and induced learning processes new phenomena and new 
characteristics arise that might affect the sets of plans constituted by the agents 
individually as well as collectively considered: all this makes up a complex process. It is 
in this sense that we maintain that the interaction of action plans gives rise to economic 
processes. Changes in the content or morphology of action plans as well as the 
interaction among them are the reasons for economic change. 
 At this point, the fundamental part of the heuristic task of the paper has been 
developed. A conceptual framework for the analysis of economic change has been 
proposed. The second goal of the paper is to describe how under certain conditions 
novelty arises within this framework. This analytic task permits us to approach the 
analysis of economic change: Where could novelty be located? How can it produce 
economic change? In which sense? Sections 4 and 5 are devoted to these questions. 
 
 
4. Action plans and novelty: the case of “ethical novelty” 
 
The starting point for this section will be the discussion of the concept of novelty within 
the evolutionary approach. Based on this discussion, a definition of novelty will be 
proposed and integrated into the action plan approach. Ethical novelty will be, in this 
context, a type of novelty that structurally transforms agents’ action plans. 
 
4.1 Novelty in evolutionary perspective: the basic ideas 
We may define novelty as the appearance of something previously unheard of. Indeed, 
if novelty refers to the appearance of something previously unheard of (new 
technologies and products, new institutions, new firms, new markets, etc.), it is difficult 
to see novelty as the outcome of search activities driven by optimising calculus. The 
outcome of search activities cannot be fully anticipated and search costs cannot be 
known in advance (Witt, 1994). However, the idea that underlies the evolutionary 
models is that searching for novelty always responds to the perception of opportunities 
to get better results than those achieved through actions deployed in the past and 
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present. In this sense, some factors that bring novelty are, for example, the taste for new 
experiences and new alternatives of action as an inherent tendency in human beings 
(Scitovsky, 1976). This tendency would be reinforced according to the favourable 
reaction of the environment when these new possibilities arise – and according to the 
hypothesis of satisfying behaviour. Activating this search for novelty takes place when 
certain levels of satisfaction (psychological, profits, etc.) are not attained (Winter, 
1984). 
 Whatever the case, it is assumed that searching for novelty or inventive learning 
processes is costly and strongly influenced by the specific capabilities of agents 
(reached through cumulative processes of adaptive practical experience). Thus, learning 
processes take place in a path-dependent localised way. This means that although they 
are essentially unpredictable, not everything can happen (Dosi, 1988). 
 Novelty generates variety and collective interactions (both within and outside 
markets) performed as selection mechanisms giving rise to differential growth of 
entities. Therefore, evolutionary change encompasses both the emergence of genuine 
novelties and the comparative diffusion of competing alternatives in markets (Metcalfe, 
1995; Foster & Metcalfe, 2001). Market competitive processes are seen as a principal 
collective interaction mechanism, while extra-market interaction networks also 
constitute an essential element in the process of creation of novelty and are a key 
element in any evolutionary process (Dosi, 2000).19  
 
4.2 Novelty in action plan perspective 
In order to deal with novelty within the conceptual framework here presented a first 
question should be addressed: where to look for novelties? Or in other words, where do 
novelties appear? This leads us to the question: how can we make novelties – which are, 
by their very nature, unpredictable – analytically tractable? 
                                                 
19 Aggregate phenomena are explained as emergent properties in evolutionary models. They are the 
collective outcome of the previously stated forms of interaction and heterogeneous creative learning. 
Examples of these emergent properties are the growth paths of factors productivity or of the GDP, the 
evolution of the indicators of industrial concentration, the change in the relative importance of different 
productive activities in multisectoral models, etc. (Allen 2001; Chiaramonte & Dosi 1993). 
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 Considering novelty as the appearance of something previously unheard of, it 
can be stated that the key analytical moment in which novelty appears is when the 
agents’ action plans are constituted or produced. This analytical moment (a) is the only 
moment in which it is possible to identify “something previously unheard of”.20 
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 The emergence of novelty can be represented, for example, as follows. Figures 6 
and 7 represent, respectively, the sudden appearance of a new objective, *2O , that is 
hierarchically superior to 2O  (Fig. 6), and its consequences in the action space (Fig. 7): 
*
2O  alters the nature of objective 1O , converting it into '1O . This affects action 3a , which 
no longer leads to objective '1O . Action 3a  is replaced by action '3a , which now leads to 
2O . Action '3a  no longer leads to '1O  (arrow crossed out). Also, linked with *2O , a 
completely new action, 4a , appears. 
 It is important to take into account that, in this perspective, the appearance of a 
new action 4a , the transformation of 3a  into '3a  and of 1O  into '1O , are all changes 
explained by the appearance of a new objective ( *2O ). 
 As an example, consider the impact on production and consumption spaces and 
on the relationships between agents, of an electoral campaign with the slogan “Internet 
for everybody”. In this case, “Internet for everybody” is a new and hierarchically 
                                                 
20 This does not mean that novelty cannot be the result of interaction and learning processes. It means 
only that, within the action plan approach, novelty is analytically located at this stage. Remember that 
novelty has not yet been revealed. 
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superior objective, *2O . Let 1a  be the human, 2a the financial, and 3a  the technological 
capital employed to achieve 1O ”to develop the infrastructure for communication”. This 
objective is the intermediate step to attaining the general objective of “social 
communication”, 2O  (Fig. 6). The emergence of the new objective *2O  transforms the 
initial plan. Now social communication is  linked to a particular technology: the Internet. 
Therefore, new needs for infrastructure arise. What is required is “communication via 
the Internet”, '2O . Action 3a  is redirected to the design of the new kind of 
communication technology. In Fig. 7 above, this change is represented by the 
emergence of '3a . But reaching the new objective *2O , “Internet for everybody” requires 
new actions ( 4a ) to disseminate a special kind of knowledge consisting of skills for 
Internet usage. The policy measures to disseminate the necessary skills also open new 
possibilities of interaction among agents.21 New ways of interacting might emerge, 
transforming the spaces of action (spaces of representation) of agents and producing 
economic change. The new action plan is depicted in Fig. 7, and is more complex than 
the previous one. 
 As shown by the previous example, novelty is integrated, or in a sense 
“endogenized”, into the theory. However, it should be stressed that novelty is not 
explained from within economics. It is rather that the action plan approach aims at 
locating, and thus “explaining” the exact place and role of novelty (what its nature is 
from the point of view of the action plan) and also at forecasting its consequences when 
it appears.22 
 Novelties operate in economic systems because economic agents incorporate 
them into their spaces of representation, thereby producing choice ex novo. “Rational 
choice is an inadequate explanation for behaviour, because neither the empirical 
premises nor the objectives of behaviour can be logically derived.” (Loasby, 2002: 
1231). As Loasby points out, the search for novelty cannot be rational, for “no kind of 
reasoning can give rise to a new idea” (Hume, 1978 [1739]: 164). 
                                                 
21 An example is the programme developed in Castilla-La-Mancha consisting of installing technical 
facilities (networks, computers, etc.) in small villages and giving Internet courses to their inhabitants. 
22 From this perspective we can no longer conclude, as Schumpeter does (1932) that “[n]ovelty is the true 
centre of everything that must be accepted as indeterminate in the most profound sense”. Novelty is only 
indeterminate as far as its precision or content is concerned, not its structure nor its properties. 
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 The action plan approach is compatible with this view: creating choice is, in the 
first place, producing new objectives of action. When agents incorporate new objectives 
into their space of representations they may trigger the discovery of new means to 
achieve these objectives. This is not incompatible with the possibility of agents also 
representing new means (actions) within their space of representations. However, this 
would be a particular case where, given certain objectives, agents incorporate (discover, 
learn, imitate, etc.) new means in order to achieve them in the best possible way. The 
most general case is the one in which objectives are produced (imagined, set, etc.) by 
the agents. Considering novelty in objectives as the most general case enables us to treat 
other particular cases like novelty in means, given objectives, given means, etc.  
 Departing thus from the general case in which the agent produces his/her 
objectives of action, we may find the novelty in objectives appearing in two ways: 
either with the introduction of an entirely new one in the action plan or the hierarchical 
change of already existing ones. 
 
4.3 Ethical novelty 
Novelty in objectives cannot be completely explained by cognitive dynamics. However, 
what has been defined as ethical dynamics plays a major role in the production of 
objectives of action. The creation of new objectives or their hierarchical reorganisation in 
the space of representations which result from ethical dynamics will be referred to as 
ethical novelty. Ethical novelty introduces new order in the space of representations. 
 Consider the following two examples to clarify ethical novelty. The first one is 
the introduction of environmental values in the perfo rmance of a multinational company 
is a source of change in the space of representations of a company. The assumption of 
the (nine) principles for human rights, labour standards and the environment of UN’s 
Global Compact program (http://www.unglobalcompact.org) at COLOPLAST is an 
example. The commitment to the environmental target 2002/2003 “research and 
operations to reduce the waste from RCC by 6%” (action ia ) is linked to the objective 
2002/2003 ( 1O ) “reduction of polymer waste» in all production plants in the targeted 
proportion”. The technical process is revised or changed in order to adapt waste 
treatment to achieve this objective (COLOPLAST 2002: 7-33). Are the technological 
changes required completely explained as a result of mere cognitive dynamics internal 
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to the company? Are they the consequence of a learning process? If not, how could they 
be better explained? 
 The objective “COLOPLAST takes responsibility for contributing to sustainable 
development” (COLOPLAST, 2003: 66) is considered superior, and thus articulates the 
company action plan. This main objective ( *2O ) links the previous actions and objectives 
involved with 2O , a more specific objective, “environmental evaluation of all products 
[new and not new]”. Additionally, this action plan is compatible with the seventh and 
eighth Global Compact principles: to “support a precautionary approach to 
environmental challenges” and “promote greater environmental responsibility”. (ibid.: 
72) The technological level and the changes inside this level are not merely explained 
by cognitive elements (factual learning processes and factual knowledge). The proposal 
for the promotion and fulfilment of the hierarchically superior objective ( *2O ) is the key 
reason for explaining the logic of the action plan, as it generates new possibilities for 
action. 
 In the second example, an agent (in this case a firm) decides to be the industry’s 
world leader. This decision can only be explained on the basis of its conception of what 
reality should be. Therefore, “being the industry’s world leader” is the objective that 
articulates the action plan of the company and that arranges the structure of 
intermediary actions.23 Research and development activities may lead to the discovery 
of a new technology, as seems to have been the case of the IBM System 370 that 
Bresnahan & Malerba (1999) present. The introduction of this system would then be 
used as a means to approach or maintain market leadership, and the introduction of the 
new technology is the condition imposed by the new objective now pursued. How can 
this “novelty” be understood from a cognitive point of view? As a consequence of 
‘learning’ without any other qualification? In our view, this statement is, in part, a result 
of cognitive dynamics, linked perhaps to the discovery of the possibility of becoming an 
industrial leader. However, the formulation of the objective “being the industry’s world 
leader” is itself a creative action: the company is inventing its end. And the invention of 
                                                 
23 The firm’s statement of the objective: “being the industry’s world leader” is an ethical novelty. It is 
important to insist here on the idea that the term “ethical” is not treated with any particular moral content. 
It refers to the fact that it is a new objective that gives a new structure to actions (whatever these may be). 
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this new end constitutes a genuine example of an “ethical novelty” as defined in the 
action plan approach. 
 Figures 1 and 2 could be reinterpreted as an illustration of the action 
implemented by IBM in the 60s and 70s, the strategic period in consolidating their 
entrepreneurial position (Bresnahan & Malerba, 1999). Thus, Figure 1 could represent 
the following IBM action plan: “consolidation of world leadership”. That is, in the 60s, 
IBM employed all its human ( 1a ), financial ( 2a ) and technological capital ( 3a ) to fulfill 
the objective of maintaining its world leadership ( 1O ), represented by IBM System 360. 
Figure 2 could represent another IBM action plan: “continued innovation of the 
dominant firm”. That is, once the objective ( 1O ) at time t + 1 is achieved, this objective 
together with action ( 3a ) (incorporation of technological capital) determines the 
achievement of ( 2O ) at the time t + 2: to introduce an innovation by the dominant firm, 
the new 370 family of computers. Observe that ( 2O ) would be impossible without 
having achieved ( 1O ). 
 Trying to explain the prior examples without using the “ethical novelty” 
approach would lead us to focus on interaction or cognitive dynamics as the main 
explanatory elements. However, considering that learning or interaction processes are 
the only elements responsible for the appearance or re-organisation of action objectives 
is falling for the “naturalist fallacy” which means deducing judgements about what 
things should be from facts alone. As an example, the fact that a man knows that he can 
walk and knows how to walk does not mean that he knows where he wants to go. 
 Our claim is that the definition, the choice of objectives greatly depends on 
particular dynamics: ethical dynamics —which is different and in an important sense 
independent of cognitive dynamics.24 In the case of COLOPLAST the environmental 
values, which are converted into specific objectives, are the result of the company’s 
interplay within the socio-economic environment in which it deploys its activities. 
These “social values” are assumed as “company values” (and this is crucial) and 
converted into new objectives which transform and re-organise the company’s space of 
                                                 
24 Borrás (2004: 431) states that the telos of an innovation system is directly linked to the ethos of the 
system. She is therefore arguing that the direction and collective objectives adopted by the system are to a 
great extent explained by the set of collective values and beliefs. 
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action. The same can be argued about IBM: the company makes the decision to become 
leader and with this intention it articulates and organises its innovation strategy. 
 
4.4 “Ethical novelty” as a source of economic change 
The identification of a source of novelty is of little interest in itself if the consequences 
in terms of economic change are not explored. In this sub-section we examine, briefly, 
the logical link between the notion of action plan and economic change. The hypothesis 
here is that ethical novelty is another source of economic change. 
 Economic change is understood as “dynamic endogenous structural change 
capable of inducing or generating novelties”. (Rubio de Urquía, 2003: 64) Let tG  be a 
society formed by successive contemporaneous groups of agents (persons and 
organisations). These groups deploy their action plans in mutual interaction. There is 
also at every point in time a state of the environment tU . The action of each agent can 
alter the dynamics of other agents, and it can alter tU  as well; the reverse is also true. 
The idea of global dynamic transformation of a social system could be represented as 
follows.25 At any given instant, consider the diverse structural elements that 
characterise the whole system tG : the cognitive dynamics of each agent i, his ethical 
dynamics, the cultural dynamics of society as a whole, as well as the state of the 
environment, tU . The global dynamics of society, denoted D t(G ) , are the dynamics of 
transformation from -t 1G  to tG . In this context, structural change refers to processes 
that transform the structural elements, and novelty refers to the occurrence of something 
that has not previously taken place in any of them. The occurrence of structural change 
and novelties induces a process that is self-organised (Rubio de Urquía, 2003: 68). It is 
necessary that mutual interaction of action plans among agents generates structural 
changes endogenously. Endogenous change means changes in the agents’ dynamics: not 
only in their cognitive dynamics, as has been largely recognised by the literature, but 
also in their ethical dynamics.  
 The main argument can be summarised as follows: if economic change is 
“dynamic endogenous structural change capable of inducing or generating novelties”; if 
structural change refers to processes that transform these structural elements; if novelty 
                                                 
25 See, for a formal argument-proof, Rubio de Urquía (2003), especially Section III. 
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refers to the occurrence of something that has not previously taken place within any of 
these elements; and if novelty could be produced by ethical dynamics producing ethical 
novelty; then ethical novelty generates economic change. 
 Assuming this argument, a deeper inquiry into the nature and consequences of 
all these processes would be necessary. But the objective of this paper is to point out the 
logical connection of all these elements in order to contribute to the theory of economic 
change, and in particular to bring the role of ethical dynamics into this explanation. 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
Agents need to cope with their inherently incomplete, fallible, and therefore conjectural 
knowledge of the world. For this they build fairly stable interpretative frameworks and 
action procedures which permit them to make decisions in a context of substantial 
uncertainty (Knight, 1921). A fundamental economic problem is how agents build these 
frameworks, that is, how they organise their knowledge (Loasby, 1991, 1999). Agents’ 
knowledge combines their perception of what reality is with their conception of what 
reality should be. Cognitive and ethical dynamics (as well as cultural dynamics) have 
been defined as the processes by which the latter perceptions and conceptions evolve 
individually and collectively. Based on these dynamics agents produce their action 
plans; the projective links from means (actions) to objectives. Changes in the agents’ 
objectives transform their plans. These changes are not merely explained by cognitive 
dynamics: they are mainly linked to ethical dynamics and are referred to here as ethical 
novelties. Ethical novelties consist of the creation of new objectives of action or their 
hierarchical re-organisation which result from ethical dynamics, and not merely 
cognitive dynamics. Thus, ethical novelty is a source of economic change because agents’ 
mutual interaction of action plans generates endogenously structural changes. 
 Some new research lines are suggested by these considerations: the implications 
of this approach for economic policy-making (Pelikan, 2003); entrepreneurship linked 
to changes in agents’ action plan objectives (Metcalfe, 2004; Witt, 2003b), and the role 
of intentionality in the explanation of innovation processes (Cañibano, Encinar & 
Muñoz, 2006). 
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